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North Korean Secondary Asylum in the UK 
 
Abstract  
The number of North Korean secondary migrants from South Korea has grown markedly in 
the last ten years. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and 
participatory observation conducted between 2012-2017, this article explores the 
motivations for North Korean secondary migration and the role of transnational networks in 
the migration and settlement trajectory. Our findings suggest that many North Koreans in 
South Korea feel discriminated against due to their origins, and unable to engage in upward 
social mobility. We argue that North Korean secondary migration to the United Kingdom 
(UK) is not a linear process of push and pull factors but a highly reactive and unpredictable 
one that depends on information fed by brokers. The UK hosts one of the largest 
communities of North Koreans outside Northeast Asia. Most North Koreans in the UK are 
secondary asylum seekers from South Korea. Their life in the UK, however, comes with its 
own set of challenges, some of which mirror co-ethnic or ideological frictions among North 
Koreans themselves, with the Korean-Chinese, or with South Koreans. This paper 
contributes to debates on multiple migration, providing a migrant-centric perspective to 
answer why people who are offered material benefits in the country they arrive in choose to 
on-migrate to a place where life can be often more challenging.  
Keyword: North Korea; secondary migration; asylum seekers; UK 
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North Korean Secondary Asylum the UK 
 
Introduction 
'LVFRQWHQW FKDUDFWHULVHV OLIH IRU PDQ\ QHZ DUULYDOV IURP 1RUWK .RUHD LQ $VLD¶V IRXUWK
largest economy. North Korean asylum seekers struggle to assimilate into South Korean 
society. Many are unhappy with the low status employment they are expected to perform, 
while others face problems adjusting to the demands of the South Korean education system. 
In response, a growing number of North Koreans have on-migrated to third countries 
(countries other than North or South Korea), in particular, the UK. This article explores the 
motivations for North Korean secondary migration1 and the role of transnational networks 
in the migration and resettlement trajectory. Central to this research is the question of why 
are North Koreans on-migrating from the Republic of Korea (hereafter, ROK or South 
Korea)? Our findings suggest that many North Koreans in South Korea feel socially and 
politically excluded, stigmatised as representatives of a poverty stricken, international 
pariah state, and unable to engage in upward social mobility. We argue that North Koreans 
engage in secondary migration for the chance escape their marginalised status and in 
response to the promise of the upward mobility that eludes them in South Korea. Once they 
are in the UK, North Koreans feel it is possible to forge an identity hinging not on their 
socio-political background, but on their ability to consume and reproduce the forms of 
symbolic capital± the English language, education through an elite institution, and 
economic success. However, hopes that life in the UK will offer freedom from the stigma 
of being North Korean are dashed because North Koreans resettling in the UK usually find 
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work in similarly low paid, low status jobs offered by South Korean employees. The inter-
ethnic dynamics that emerge subsequently mirror unequal Korean Peninsula politics. This 
paper contributes to debates on secondary migration, providing a migrant-centric 
perspective to answer why immigrants who are expected to quickly assimilate to the host 
society and who receive material benefits upon resettlement choose to on-migrate to a place 
where life is often equally challenging.  
 
Onward Asylum: a global trend and a case from North Korea 
6HFRQGDU\PLJUDWLRQDOVRNQRZQDVµWZR-VWHS¶PLJUDWLRQDQGµUH-PLJUDWLRQ¶LVDFRPPRQ
feature of global movement in an increasingly interconnected world. The promise of 
increased economic opportunities play an important role in the onward movement of 
immigrants (Finch et al. 2009: 4). However, to reduce secondary migration to economics 
overlooks several key factors such as a desire for accumulating other forms of capital. 
Ayumi Takenaka (2007; 2015) cites evidence from foreign students and business people in 
Japan who on-migrate to the U.S. to argue that social and cultural capital accumulation 
plays a central role in the decision to on-migrate. The skills, knowledge, and resources that 
are developed in the initial country of resettlement may be imagined as holding greater 
value in another country. This is certainly the case with North Koreans who on-migrate 
from South Korea. Unlike the Tokyo-based Chinese businessmen and Korean students that 
Takenaka discusses, North Koreans develop an awareness of the challenges that confront 
them in acquiring social capital valued in South Korean society. They also become attuned 
to the transnational strategies many South Koreans pursue to accumulate these forms of 
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capital, namely migration to Western, Anglophone countries. Krassoi-3HDFK¶V(2013) study 
of immigrants in New Zealand who on-migrate suggests that timing is an important factor 
determining the decision to move. After two years, immigrants to New Zealand qualify for 
a visa that allows for the indefinite right to return to New Zealand, if the individual 
migrates to another country (2013: 31). North Koreans are similarly required to reside in 
South Korea prior to the government permitting them to exit the country. Out migration 
during the first two years a North Korean is in South Korea is uncommon, due to ongoing 
state surveillance and the debt many individuals have accrued to illegal migration brokers 
for their initial journey to South Korea.  
As state strategies for managing complex migration patterns have become more 
sophisticated, so have the transnational networks of informal people movers become more 
responsive to shifting state policy. Takenaka concludes that secondary migration to the U.S. 
is part of a broader trend of migration to wealthy countries (2007). The migration networks 
that are established through early waves of outward migration facilitate the movement that 
follows. These findings accord with our research into North Korean secondary migration. 
As the informal people moving networks connecting North and South Korea through China 
have grown more robust, these networks have both fuelled and responded to demand for 
secondary migration from South Korea. The secondary migration of North Koreans targets 
destination countries that feature prominently in the South Korean imagination as affluent 
nations offering opportunities unavailable to ordinary Koreans. Consequently, the 
secondary migration of North Koreans follows similar patterns to the migration of South 
Koreans, connecting Seoul to places like London, Toronto, and Sydney.  
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The secondary migration of North Koreans has not been systematically recorded 
and studied. The number of secondary asylum seekers is unknown to the authors as it is not 
publicly available. There exists a handful of policy-oriented case studies on North Korean 
migration (Robinson 2010, Yuan 2011, Cohen 2012) and a growing corpus of ethnographic 
research speaking to North Korean secondary migration (Choo 2006, Chung 2008, Bell 
2013a, 2013b, 2016, Jung 2013, Koo 2016).  
As of November 2016, the UK hosts one of the largest North Korean populations 
outside of Northeast Asia. Research by the authors confirmed that a considerable number of 
North Koreans in the UK had previously applied for and succeeded in gaining asylum in 
South Korea before choosing to onward migrate to a third country. However, because 
acknowledging the fact that they had been offered primary protection under the South 
Korean government could void their applications in the UK, applicants do not tell this to 
British authorities. For the South Korean government, the secondary migration of North 
Korean refugees signals that the state-sponsored resettlement programmes for North 
Koreans are not working. According to the British Office for National Statistics, there were 
about 1,000 North Koreans holding resident status in the UK as of 2015 (Office for 
National Statistics 2015). The UK Home Office argues that secondary migrants are not 
genuine asylum seekers as they have availed themselves of a primary protector (South 
Korea).2 However, the Home Office struggles to differentiate between the three groups of 
North Korean asylum seekers: those seeking political asylum via a third country outside the 
Korean peninsula; those who first sought asylum in South Korea and acquired South 
Korean citizenship; and ethnic-Korean Chinese citizens (&KRVǂQMRN) posing as North 
Korean. 3  A survey conducted by the Seoul-based Institute for Peace and Unification 
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Studies in 2007 found that 258 out of 415 North Korean asylum applicants in the UK were 
suspected to be Chinese nationals (Park et al. 2013). 
 
Data and methodologies 
Drawing on semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and participatory 
observation,4 this article explores the complex and competing motivations and experiences of 
North Korean secondary migration from South Korea to the UK between 2005-2016. 
Fieldwork for this research combined semi-structured interviews in Korean and in English, 
focus group workshops and outdoor group activities that took place over two weeks, 
annually, between in 2011 and 2016 in New Malden, Cambridge, London, and Swansea in 
the UK, and Seoul and Ansan in South Korea. In 2011-2012, preliminary interviews took 
place with 57 individuals (see Annex 1). These preliminary interviews were the basis for the 
planning of the focus group discussion and outdoor activities that took place in 2013-2014. 
Participants for focus groups were self-selected. A call for focus group participants was 
advertised through North Korean community leaders and the social network mobile media 
called Kakaotalk. The size of each focus group was limited to 15 to generate more informal 
settings. All sessions took place in New Malden for the convenience of the participants who 
lived there. Six participants attended all five focus group sessions. These core participants 
were over 35 years old, with higher education in North Korea and good English 
communication skills. Of the six core focus group participants, four stood out in presenting a 
high level of curiosity, learning, adaptability and self-organisation skills in new 
environments. In 2015-2016, we carried out follow-up interviews with these four individuals 
to learn more about their self-organising skills and path dependence. The interviews took ten 
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days in total, over two years, 6-7 hours a day. Most participants had secondary or university 
education and used to live in the Northeast provinces of North Korea. All participants 
escaped across the Sino-Korean border and spent varying amounts of time in China before 
on-migrating to South Korea.  
The main body of this paper is organised as follows: first we discuss why so many 
North Koreans struggle to adapt to life in South Korea, suggesting that mismatching 
expectations, government resettlement strategies, and the inability of most North Koreans 
to achieve upward mobility in South Korea encourages secondary migration. We proceed 
by drawing on quantitative data to analyse patterns of North Korean secondary migration, 
DQGFRQFOXGH WKDW6RXWK.RUHDKDVVKLIWHGIURPDµGHVWLQDWLRQFRXQWU\¶ IRU1RUWK.RUHDQ
DV\OXP VHHNHUV WR EHLQJ D K\EULG µGHVWLQDWLRQWUDQVLW FRXQWU\¶ WKURXJK ZKLFK D large 
number of North Koreans are planning their onward movement. We further suggest that 
data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and South 
.RUHD¶V0LQLVWU\RI8QLILFDWLRQLOOXVWUDWHVWKDWWKHWUDQVQDWLRQDOQHWZRUNVIDFLOLWDWLQJNorth 
Korean secondary migration are highly responsive to changing migration policies in 
destination countries in the Western world. We conclude by focusing on the experiences of 
North Korean secondary migrants in the UK, their motivations for migrating to and staying 
in the UK, and the challenges that life in their new home presents.  
 
Failed Integration in South Korea  
 
As of 2017, there are around 30,000 North Koreans living in South Korea at present (see 
Figure 1 below).5  7KLVILJXUHLVPDUJLQDOJLYHQ6RXWK.RUHD¶VPLOOLRQSRSXODWLRQRUHYHQ
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North .RUHD¶V  PLOOLRQ (World Bank). In South Korea North Koreans are not treated as 
refugees in accordance with international law. Rather, North Koreans are regarded within 
their own, special category, as displaced persons. This has been the case since the ceasefire to 
the Korean War, in 1953. Compared to the total number of refugees resettled in South Korea 
between 2004 and 2016, from Myanmar, Bangladeshi and Ethiopia,6 the number of North 
Koreans resettled in South Korea is significant. The ROK government spends a considerable 
DPRXQW RI WD[SD\HUV¶ PRQH\ RQ UHVHWWOHPHQW SURJUDPPHV IRU 1RUWK .RUHDQV 7KHVH
programs include long-lease rented housing, basic settlement expenses, affirmative action for 
tertiary education, and employment incentives to encourage North Koreans to enter the 
workforce as swiftly as possible (The Ministry of Unification 2014). Despite the generous 
resettlement package, a large number of North Koreans are opting to on-migrate from South 
Korea. South Korean Ministry of Unification officials we interviewed in 2011 and 2014 
explained that the government regards North Koreans on-migrating from South Korea as an 
³HPEDUUDVVPHQW´7  
 
[Figure1. North Korean Arrivals in South Korea] 
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[Source: Ministry of Unification at http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1440] 
 
 *HQGHU FODVV SROLWLFDO EDFNJURXQG DQGHFRQRPLF VWDWXV FURVVFXW1RUWK.RUHDQV¶
migration and resettlement experiences. Despite similarities with South Koreans in terms of 
language, culture, and history, North Koreans are not migrating to South Korea in the same 
VHQVH WKDW µURRWV PLJUDQWV¶ (Wessendorf 2007) return to the homeland after generations 
away. The unexpected challenges associated with life in South Korea exacerbate feelings of 
alienation and unsettle an already tenuous ethnic solidarity with the host society. North 
Koreans in South Korea struggle to achieve the upward mobility anticipated prior to arrival 
(Lankov 2006). In 2012, 46.7% of North Koreans living in South Korea fell below the 
poverty line and were receiving basic subsistence from the government (Kang 2012). One 
North Korean interlocutor we interviewed during a workshop in New Malden stated that 
6RXWK .RUHD¶V 0R8 VXSSRUt was ³just enough for us [North Koreans] to get by, but not 
nearly enough to succeed´.8 Scholarship relating the experiences of North Korean refugees 
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Female 632 811 1272 960 1513 1981 2195 2252 1811 1911 1098 1145 1092 1025
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in South Korea describes a mismatch of expectations on both sides: the host society expects 
North Koreans to perform the subservient role of grateful asylum seeker, and new arrivals 
expect access to the opportunities they heard are available in wealthy South Korea. Park et 
al. (2013) describe this relationship as a double-edged sword, whereby ordinary South 
Koreans regard the new arrivals as both helpless victims escaping a repressive regime and 
as a burdensome tax drain.  
  Following their arrival in South Korea, North Korean asylum seekers, described in 
WKH6RXWK.RUHDQPHGLDDV³GHIHFWRUHVFDSHHV talbukja´RU³QHZVHWWOHUV saetomin´DUH
taken to secret detention centres in Seoul and interrogated by ROK state security for around 
two months. Following their interrogation, in preparation for living in South Korea, all new 
arrivals go through cultural education in the government operated Hanawon facility. The 
training they receive at the Hanawon centre is supposed to prepare them for everyday life in 
South Korea. For example, they learn how to use ATM machines, how to use the subway, 
how to avoid being defrauded, and how to open and use a bank account. However, this 
training offers little consideration that new arrivals may wish to stay in touch with family 
who remain in North Korea. All Koreans in South Korea are forbidden from contacting or 
FRPPXQLFDWLQJ ZLWK ³D PHPEHU RI DQ DQWL-JRYHUQPHQW RUJDQLVDWLRQ´ E\ WKH 1DWLRQDO
Security Laws.9 For North Koreans in South Korea, contacting their family members who are 
still in North Korea can be a breach of the National Security Law. Although the Inter-Korean 
Exchange and Cooperation Law10 allows inter-Korean communication with government pre-
approval, it is very rare that North Koreans in South Korea would report to the South Korean 
authority when they contact their family members back in North Korea. All North Koreans 
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are under state surveillance for several years following their arrival, this includes monitoring 
their communications with family and friends outside the ROK. 
  For many North Koreans, life in South Korea is challenging without adaquate skills 
and education. In 2011, the unemployment rate among North Koreans resident in South 
Korea was 12% (Hana Foundation 2015) FRPSDUHG WR WKDW RI 6RXWK .RUHDQV¶ 3.4% 
(Statistics Korea 2011). In 2017, the unemployment rate among North Koreans improved to 
7.2% (South Koreans at 4.3% during the same period), according to the Hana Foundation, a 
government agency that helps settle North Koreans. However, two in five new arrivals are 
engaged in temporary work. During our focus group discussions, many participants explained 
the difficulties they had experienced in adjusting to life in South Korea; some felt unable to 
be themselves, forced to hide their North Korean identity in public. Others described the 
discrimination they had experienced in South Korean schools and workplaces. One focus 
JURXSSDUWLFLSDQWGXULQJDGLVFXVVLRQRQFXOWXUHDQGYDOXHVVDLG³,W¶VRNWROLYHKHUH>LQWhe 
UK] as one of many second-class or third-class citizens. There are yellow, brown, and black 
SHRSOHKHUHDQG,¶PMXVWRQHRIWKHP+RZHYHULQ6RXWK.RUHD,FDQ¶WKDQGOHEHLQJWUHDWHG
like a second-FODVV FLWL]HQ E\ P\ IHOORZ .RUHDQV ,W¶V XQEHDUDEOH´ /ife in London is 
imagined as offering greater anonymity for the North Korean migrant. In moving to a third 
FRXQWU\ 1RUWK .RUHDQV H[WUDFW WKHPVHOYHV IURP 6RXWK .RUHD¶V µKLHUDUFKLFDO QDWLRQKRRG¶ 
(Seol and Skrentny 2009), in which they compare poorly in relation to immigrants from 
wealthier, more affluent countries. South Korean state settlement strategies further contribute 
WR1RUWK.RUHDQV¶GLIILFXOWLHVLQUHVHWWOLQJ 
 
Transplanting the Village 
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The South Korean government commonly houses new arrivals in state apartment complexes 
throughout the major cities of South Korea. Individuals who are allocated an apartment on 
the outskirts of Seoul are settled in complexes housing thousands of other immigrants from 
North Korea. These complexes are also home to working and middle class South Koreans. 
Housing North Koreans in close proximity to each other allows ROK police officers and 
social workers, designated with keeping an eye on new arrivals, easier access to their 
charges. Unintentionally, the ROK housing strategy also recreates social conditions in North 
Korea. The majority of North Koreans to arrive in the south are from the northern provinces 
of the country and, to some extent, ROK government resettlement transplants these 
communities to the outer suburbs of Seoul. As such, many North Koreans feel that migration 
to South Korea does not entirely remove them from the social controls extant in North Korea. 
Surrounded by individuals from the hometown and in close geographical proximity to the 
DPRK, life in South Korea fails to permit North Koreans to escape what Caroline Brettell 
UHIHUVWRDVµWKHPHFKDQLVPVRIYLOODJHVRFLDOFRQWURO¶ (2003: 68). The feeling expressed by 
many interlocutors interviewed in Seoul was that, although they no longer live in North 
Korea, North Korea continues to loom large in their life in South Korea. The social 
surveillance they experienced in North Korea continues in South Korea. For individuals who 
have family in North Korea, worries that what they say and do could be reported back to the 
North Korean government by informants adds to the alienation of life in South Korea. During 
visits to the homes of North Koreans in Seoul, interlocutors explained that they rarely went a 
single day without meeting others from North Korea, either in their apartment block or in the 
surrounding neighbourhood. Because of the importance of maintaining their privacy and, in 
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PDQ\FDVHVWKHLUDQRQ\PLW\OLYLQJLQµWUDQVSODQWHG1RUWK.RUHDQYLOODJHV¶SURYRNHVVLPLODr 
anxiety as living in North Korea.  
  Stories of individuals who on-migrate to Canada, the UK, or the US are common 
within the transplanted North Korean communities in South Korea. Through such stories the 
possibilities imagined through secondary migration exercises a strong pull on North Koreans. 
Secondary migration to Western countries is imagined as a welcome alternative to a 
marginalised, surveilled status in South Korea. The material benefits expected through 
secondary migration to Western countries is a further driving pull factor for North Koreans in 
South Korea. 
 
Symbols of Prestige 
What opportunities do North Koreans in South Korea imagine are made available through 
secondary migration? For North Korean secondary migrants the emphasis is on the 
acquisition of symbolic capital and the chance to engage in upward social mobility that 
appears out of reach in South Korea. Brettell describes the economic and cultural 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIXSZDUGPRELOLW\DVµV\PEROVRISUHVWLJH¶ WKDWDUHDFFRUGHGWo migrants 
who are able to ascend the social ladder (2003: 68). The desire for prestige is universal, but 
the means by which migrants procure these symbols and the expression the symbols take 
YDU\IURPSODFHWRSODFH1RUWK.RUHDQV¶GHVLUHGVRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOFDSLWDO LVFRQVWLWXWHG
by middle class South Korean aspirations ± the accumulation of financial capital and the 
attendant conspicuous consumption; competency in the English language; education 
qualifications from an overseas (preferably Anglophone) institution; and overseas 
experience. One outdoor activity participanW VD\V ³6RXWK .RUHDn parents send their kids 
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RYHUVHDV WR VWXG\ (QJOLVK EXW ZH >1RUWK .RUHDQ SDUHQWV@ FDQ¶W DIIRUG WR VHQG RXUV ,W¶V
expensive. But we know we can send ours alone or come with the kids and claim refugee 
status. At least we can stay for 3-6 months and learn English for free while our asylum 
applications are being processed. Even if we fail, at least we get those 3- PRQWKV¶ IUHH
HGXFDWLRQDQGKRXVLQJEHIRUHZH¶UHVHQWEDFNWR6RXWK.RUHD´11 
For North Koreans unhappy with conditions in South Korea, secondary migration is 
imagined as the only means for achieving economic success and the attendant upward 
social mobility.  The accumulation of economic and cultural capital requires an audience to 
acknowledge these successes (Basch, N. et al. 1994, Schiller and Fouron 2001, Espiritu 
2003). Many North Koreans subsequently illustrate their successes by sending financial 
remittances back to family in North Korea. Another means of showing their successes is by 
posting pictures on social media that speak to their new lives in London12. The following 
section draws on quantitative data to illustrate the scale of North Korean transnational 
secondary migration networks. Transnational migratory networks, highly responsive to 
shifting state policies in destination countries, play a significant role in feeding the desire 
for success through secondary migration. 
 
The Scale and Trends of North Korean Secondary Migration  
 
North Korean Migration to Transit and Destination Countries 
In illustrating why North Koreans on-migrate from South Korea, it is important to also 
understand the broader trends of North Korean migration, this includes North Korean 
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PLJUDQWV¶UHODWLRQVKLSWRµWUDQVLW¶DQGµGHVWLQDWLRQ¶FRXQWULHV7UDQVLWFRXQWULHVDUe places to 
which North Koreans migrate in order to claim asylum and, after varying periods of time, on-
migrate to other destinations. Thailand, Myanmar, and Mongolia are examples of places 
commonly used as transit countries by North Korea asylum seekers. Destination countries are 
final target countries in which North Koreans desire resettlement. Examples of destination 
countries include South Korea, Canada, the UK, and Germany. According to the UNHCR, 
the number of asylum applications from North Koreans between 2000 and 2015 are highest 
in Canada, followed by the UK, Germany, Russia, and Thailand. 
 
  [Figure 2: Top 15 North Korean Asylum Application in 2000-2015]   
 
[Source: UNHCR Population Statistics 2016] 
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The majority of North Koreans who resettle in South Korea stay in South Korea. However, 
rHFHQWO\6RXWK.RUHD¶VSUHPLHUSRVLWLRQLQ1RUWK.RUHDQV¶PLJUDWLRQVWUDWHJLHVhas shifted 
from not just being a destination country to a hybrid destination. The largest community of 
North Koreans living outside the DPRK resides in China or South Korea. Furthermore, a 
number of North Koreans using South Korea as a transit point for onward movement to 
Europe and North America has grown over the years (Song 2015). The majority of North 
Korean asylum seekers in Western Europe, North America, and Australia are secondary 
migrants from South Korea.  
  Figure 1 illustrates the number of North Korean asylum applications in the UK since 
2003. According to the 2015 UNHCR data, there were 620 North Korean refugees and other 
humanitarian migrants living in the UK. Between 2006 and 2007 there was a notable increase 
in the number of North Koreans claiming asylum in the UK, from 61 to 602 (see Figure 1). 
There are two possible explanations for this increase. First, there is a relationship to the 
increased number of arrivals in South Korea: the more North Koreans that have arrived in 
South Korea, the more secondary migration has increased. Finch et al. offers similar 
explanations for the increased re-migration of immigrants from the UK back to their home 
countries (2009: 3). Indeed, the number of new arrivals in South Korea jumped from 1,384 in 
2005 to 2,028 in 2006, according to the MoU.  
  The second explanation is drawn from the theory of cumulative causation that 
explains how migration changes the structures of sending and receiving states. Douglas 
Massey explains that, over time, migration network expansion becomes self-perpetuating. 
.H\ WR WKLV SURFHVV LV WKH UROH RI µHQWHUSULVLQJ DJHQWV FRQWUDFWRUV DQG RWKHU PLGGOHPHQ
[who] move to create migrant-VXSSRUWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV¶), and earlier migrants, who 
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lay the tracks of movement and made it easier, cheaper, and safer for those who followed. 
Formal and informal networks facilitate secondary migration from South Korea to the UK. 
1RUWK.RUHDQ¶VPLJUDWLRQWRSODFHVOLNH1HZ0DOGHQHFKo the movement of South Koreans 
who moved decades before them, for what was imagined as better education, business, and 
lifestyle opportunities13(VWDEOLVKHGPLJUDWRU\LQIUDVWUXFWXUHDUHHYLGHQWLQ/RQGRQ¶V.RUHD
Town. Travel agents on the New Malden high street advertise, in Korean script, discount 
flights to Seoul and express delivery of goods direct from the UK to Korea. For North 
.RUHDQVHFRQGDU\PLJUDQWVWKHµHQWHUSULVLQJDJHQWVFRQWUDFWRUVDQGPLGGOHPHQ¶FRQQHFWLQJ
Seoul to London are North Korean migration brokers. These individuals combine the promise 
of financial success in a wealthy Anglophone country with assurances that life in London 
will not be an alien experience due to the established Korean population to entice individuals 
to the UK. We discuss these networks further in the section which follows. 
 
[Figure3.North Korean asylum applications in the UK: 2003-2015] 
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2I IXUWKHU VLJQLILFDQFH DUH WKH µSXVK-down and pop-XS¶ HIIHFWV RI 1RUWK .RUHDQ RQZDUG-
migration to Western countries, as illustrated in figure 2. When the number of asylum seekers 
in Canada was pushed down in 2013, the number subsequently increased in Germany. A 
similar pattern can be seen when the number of migrants to the UK dropped in 2009 and the 
	
 
Year	
Total	
persons	
pending	
start-
year	
Applied	
during	
year	 Recognized	 Others	 Rejected	
Otherwise	
closed	
Total	
decisions	
Total	
persons	
pending	
end-year	
2003	 0	 15	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 0	
2004	 0	 27	 6	 11	 36	 13	 66	 0	
2005	 0	 42	 4	 12	 12	 5	 33	 0	
2006	 0	 61	 20	 11	 8	 4	 43	 0	
2007	 0	 602	 204	 19	 19	 15	 257	 0	
2008	 0	 273	 279	 10	 77	 68	 434	 0	
2009	 0	 56	 3	 1	 60	 42	 106	 0	
2010	 0	 54	 1	 6	 141	 28	 176	 0	
2011	 45	 30	 8	 4	 46	 8	 66	 15	
2012	 15	 30	 9	 0	 15	 4	 28	 17	
2013	 40	 51	 10	 2	 25	 1	 38	 56	
2014	 56	 38	 -	 -	 23	 -	 33	 59	
2015	 59	 49	 0	 0	 43	 9	 52	 47	
Total	 215	 1328	 544	 76	 505	 198	 1333	 194	
[Source: UNHCR Population Data, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers] 
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number in Canada subsequently rose in 2012. The correlation between the rejection rate and 
the application rate, and the push-down and pop-up effects illustrate that North Korean 
secondary migration networks are not only self-perpetuating, they are also reactive and 
adaptive to state level legal and political changes. For example, the number of North Korean 
asylum applications in the UK dipped to 56 in 2009. At the same time, the applicant rejection 
rate increased from the lowest point of 7.4%, in 2007 to 80.1% in 2010. This sudden drop in 
applications occurred in response to the British and South Korean governments sharing the 
biodata of registered North Koreans claiming asylum in the UK. The knock-on effect is 
evident in the increased number of North Korean asylum seekers subsequently entering 
Canada (see Figure 2).  
 
[Figure 4: Top 5 Destination Countries of North Korean Asylum Applications: 2000-
2015] 
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[Source: UNHCR Populations Statistics Asylum Seekers] 
    
Responsive Transnational Networks 
1RUWK.RUHDQV¶GHFLVLRQV LQUHODWLRQWRZKHUHDQGZKHQWRRQ-migrate, are shaped through 
interactions with migration brokers, other North Koreans, and state immigration policies. In 
South Korea, many North Koreans socialise through civic organisations and church groups.14 
Further, several members-only online communities share information about secondary 
migration to Western Europe and North America.15 Information on potential obstacles to on-
migration, such as the fingerprint database sharing agreement between South Korea and the 
UK, is quickly spread amongst participants on and offline. Families, relatives, friends and 
Hanawon (the MoU resettlement centre) alumni form a broad social network using social 
media to circulate and exchange information on the best strategies for onward-migration and 
the destination countries most receptive to asylum claims at each moment. 
  The destination countries of North Korean secondary migrants are predominantly 
liberal democracies, obliged to keep their economies and societies open to trade and 
migration, this includes asylum seekers (Hollifield 2004: 897). These countries exhibit 
comparatively favourable attitudes towards North Korean asylum seekers, as demonstrated 
by a social welfare system that offers support for successful claimants such as unemployment 
or disability benefits and a state funded education system. If a government starts to regulate 
migration more tightly, demanding stricter controls, or a destination country becomes less 
receptive towards applicants, indicated by a shift in public opinion, North Korean migrant 
networks respond accordingly. The flow of on-migrants to one destination country shifts to 
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another, redistributing pressure on receiving states by channelling asylum seekers away from 
unfavourable countries towards countries with more favourable policies.  
  North Korean informal migration networks exist as part of a self-perpetuating 
transnational migratory system, sensitive to the shifting domestic and international conditions 
within the countries selected as destination countries for on-migration. Within this system, 
EURNHUV DUH VXFFHVVIXO LQ WUDGLQJ WKHLU µPLJUDWRU\ FXOWXUDO FDSLWDO¶ (Van Hear 1998) ± their 
knowledge of how to go about migration ± for financial gain. We spoke with a former 
migrant broker, who facilitated the movement of North Korean refugees to China, Laos, and 
Thailand. He told us that he offered secondary migration packages with which, for a price, 
North Koreans can travel to destination countries with ready-made stories of conflict or 
persecution to claim refuge in Western Europe or North America. The former broker had 
extensive transnational networks in China, South Korea, UK, Germany, Canada, and the US. 
+HZDVZHOOLQIRUPHGRIHDFKVWDWH¶VLPPLJUDWLRQDQGDV\OXPSROLFLHVDVZHOODVWKHVXFFHVV
rates in each for asylum applications. He is one of many brokers working within the 
HPHUJLQJ 1RUWK .RUHDQ GLDVSRUD ZKR IXQFWLRQ DV ³QRGHV´ RI LQIRUPDWLRQ IDFLOLWDWLQJ DQG
HQFRXUDJLQJ WKH RQZDUG PRYHPHQW RI 1RUWK .RUHDQV IURP 6RXWK .RUHD 1RUWK .RUHDQV¶
negative experiences in South Korea have been capitalised on by informal people movers 
who offer secondary migration as a means to satisfy the desires North Koreans held in 
regards to South Korea.   
 
Life in the UK 
 
Dual Nationality, Multiple Identities  
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One of the principal legal questions when assessing North Korean asylum claims in third 
countries is the dual South Korean and North Korean nationality of applicants (Song 2013). 
Article 3 of the ROK Constitution VWDWHVµThe territory of the Republic of Korea (the ROK) 
shall consist of the Korean peniQVXODDQG LWVDGMDFHQW LVODQGV¶ The Constitution underlines 
WKH 52.¶V FODLPV RYHU ERWK WKH ODQG DQG WKH FLWL]HQU\ RI ERWK .RUHDV 6XEVHTXHQWO\ DOO
.RUHDQV LQ µQRUWKHUQ¶ .RUHD DUH QRW VWDWHOHVV EHFDXVH WKHy are ROK citizens. As ROK 
citizens they are not entitled to claim refugee status or asylum in a third country. Arguing that 
1RUWK.RUHDQV DUHQRW HOLJLEOH IRU DV\OXP LQ D WKLUG FRXQWU\EHFDXVH WKH\ DUHERWK µ1RUWK
.RUHDQDQG6RXWK.RUHDQ¶LVDWRGGVZLWKthe temporary nature of the truce that was signed 
by North Korea, China, and the United Nations (U.N.), in 1953. Andrew Wolman (2012) 
examines recent court cases on North Korean asylum applications from Australia, Canada, 
and the UK and how these countries consider the issue of 1RUWK .RUHDV¶ dual nationality. 
Wolman FDOOVIRUWKHSULQFLSOHRIµHIIHFWLYHQDWLRQDOLW\¶UDWKHUWKDQPHUHO\IRUPDOQDWLRQDOLW\, 
arguing WKDW DOWKRXJK 6RXWK .RUHD PD\ FODLP 1RUWK .RUHDQV DV FLWL]HQV 1RUWK .RUHDQV¶
ROK citizenship does not offer adequate support prior to and following their arrival in South 
Korea.  
  For North Koreans who struggle to resettle in South Korea, their newly acquired 
FLWL]HQVKLS EHFRPHV DQ LQVWUXPHQW IRU VHFRQGDU\ PLJUDWLRQ $LKZD 2QJ ZULWHV ³>W@KH
multiple passport holder is an apt contemporary figure; he or she embodies the split between 
state-imposed identity and personal identity caused by political upheavals, migration, and 
FKDQJLQJ JOREDOPDUNHWV´ (Ong 1999). Ong explains that transnational practices promote a 
flexible attitude towards citizenship. The ROK passport that North Koreans acquire 
underlines the bio-political contest between two competing states. North Koreans who escape 
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their country embody diverging state identities characterised by confrontational Cold War 
ideology. As representatives of the divided Korean people and an enemy state, the body of 
the North Korean stands in opposition to South Korean claims over North Korea. We suggest 
WKDW1RUWK.RUHDQV¶LQVWUXPHQWDOLVDWLRQRIWKH52.SDVVSRUWLVQRWDUHMHFWLRQRIWKHHWKQLF
community. Rather, it is emblematic of their prioritising freedom to define their own 
identities and perceived opportunities in third countries over a marginalised existence in 
South Korea. These North Koreans have become a highly resilient population. Having 
survived several irregular border crossings in China and Southeast Asia, and accumulated 
agency of their own in South Korea, North Korean secondary asylum seekers adapt to 
precarious conditions by taking further risks for what is imagined as long term gain. 
  Highly responsive transnational networks, characterised by nodes composed of 
migration brokers, facilitate the secondary migration of North Koreans from South Korea to 
destination countries. As advised by migration brokers, North Koreans usually come to the 
UK as visa-free tourists with South Korean passports and apply for humanitarian protection 
visas. While the UK Home Office reviews their application, the claimant stays in the UK 
with state funded housing, a subsistence allowance, and English language lessons. Pending 
the outcome of their application, secondary migrants often change their names and further 
obfuscate the details of their life prior to arrival in the UK. After five years with UK 
protection visas, asylum seekers are entitled to indefinite leave to remain in the country. A 
year after they are granted indefinite leave, they are also eligible to apply for British 
citizenship (GOV.uk n.d.). With the exception of asylum seekers over the age of sixty-five, 
UHIXJHHVLQWKH8.DUHUHTXLUHGWRWDNHDµ/LIHLQWKH8.¶H[DPLQDWLRQDQGSDVVDQ(QJOLVK
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language qualification. This constitutes one of many distinct challenges for North Korean 
secondary migrants, as they usually have little to no English communication skills.  
   
The little North Korean bubble in New Malden  
Most North Koreans in the UK live on the outskirts of London, in the so-FDOOHG µ.RUHD
7RZQ¶LQ1HZ0DOGHQ7KLVLVWKHPRVWSRSXORXV.RUHDQFRPPXQLW\LQ(XURSH7KHPDLQ
street of New Malden has a large number of Korean restaurants, travel agents, and 
supermarkets, and there are several locally produced Korean language newspapers. Many 
South Koreans in New Malden own small to medium sized businesses that serve the local 
Korean population. Commonly, North Koreans, regardless of their legal status, work in these 
businesses as cheap, unskilled labour. Many of the North Koreans we met said they were 
µVHOI-HPSOR\HG¶ ZRUNLQJ DV FOHDQHUV FRRNV RU VKRS DVVLVWDQWV LQ ORZ-paid positions. The 
social and spiritual needs of the Korean community are served through ethnic Korean 
churches in which the pastors conduct services in both Korean and English. Within New 
Malden, Korean-Chinese were once the main labour pool for South Korean capital. Korean-
Chinese now compete with North Koreans willing to work for less remuneration.  
  Myron Weiner (1996) wrote, µWKHPRUHEHQHILWVZHRIIHUDV\OXPVHHNHUV OHJDODLG
IUHHKRXVLQJPHGLFDOFDUHIRRGHPSOR\PHQW WKHPRUHSHRSOHDUHOLNHO\WRVHHNDV\OXP¶ 
North Koreans who on-PLJUDWH IURP6RXWK.RUHD FRQWUDGLFW:HLQHU¶s claims that benefits 
are a strong enough factor keeping refugees in the place they are offered asylum. There are a 
number of motivations for the secondary migration of North Koreans to the UK, not limited 
to the promise of state housing and employment, age, and welfare packages. However, the 
South Korean government also offers these benefits. North Koreans on-migrate to third 
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countries in the hope that they will improve their chances of achieving the upward mobility 
that eludes them long after their arrival in South Korea. Among the perceived symbols of 
success are access to an Anglophone education; knowledge and participation in local politics; 
the opportunity to accumulate financial capital, and the perceived greater symbolic value of a 
Canadian or British passport in comparison to a ROK passport.  
  There is a notable education gap between North Koreans and South Koreans (Yi, Cho 
et al. 2009, Kim 2016)<RXQJ1RUWK.RUHDQVVWUXJJOHLQ6RXWK.RUHD¶VKLJKO\FRPSHWLWLYH
education environment. This is further exacerbated by the long period of time many North 
Korean children spend outside of formal education, while in transit or in informal 
employment. All interviewees and focus group participants for this study arrived in the UK 
as a family unit. One participant for the outdoor activity in the Westminster Abbey said³I 
pray for my kids every day. &RPLQJKHUH>WKH8.@LVDOODERXWWKHNLGV¶HGXFDWLRQ. Nothing 
else. I want them to go to a good university. They both speak good English now, so hope they 
go to a good school [university] and become a lawyer or something6RXWK.RUHDQNLGVGRQ¶W
NQRZ WKH\¶UH 1RUWK .RUHDQ ,W¶V D VHFUHW´17 Won-hwan Oh points to the British education 
system as a factor in the decision to on-migrate from South Korea (Oh 2011). Another 
SDUWLFLSDQWLQWKHWRXUWRWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI&DPEULGJHVDLG³1RPDWWHUKRZKDUG\RXVWXG\LQ
South Korea, the best university you can do is Seoul National University, which is not even 
LQWKHZRUOG¶VWRS3ULYDWHWXLWLRQLVVRH[SHQVLYHLQ6RXWK.RUHD. You probably spend less 
time studying in the UK than you would in Korea, but you can still go to Cambridge 
8QLYHUVLW\ZKLFK LV WKHZRUOG¶VQXPEHURQH´0DQ\ LQ WKHJURXSDJUHHG0RVWVFKRRO-age 
children of North Korean secondary migrants in the UK are either born in South Korea or in 
the UK, and attend British state schools. They speak English among themselves and to their 
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classmates and use Korean, of varying ability, to their parents. The younger generation, 
embedded as they are in their everyday lives in the UK, often have a better understanding of 
the host society than their parents do. When in public, young second generation North 
Koreans are more familiar with the British approach to such things as shopping, using public 
transport, and interacting wLWK (QJOLVK VSHDNHUV &KLOGUHQ RIWHQ DFW DV WKHLU SDUHQWV¶
interpreters when required. There is a notable generational difference in how new arrivals 
relate to the host society (Imoagene 2012, Kim 2013).  
 Some parents expressed concern that their children were losing their North Korean 
identity and, in the future, communication would become a struggle. One workshop 
particLSDQW SXW LW ³,¶P ZRUULHG DERXW P\ \RXQJHU FKLOGUHQ 7KH ILUVW RQH VSHDNV JRRG
Korean but the \RXQJHU RQHVGRQ¶W7KDW¶VZK\ , VWDUWHG6DWXUGD\ VFKRROV WR WHDFK WKHP
&KRVǂQ- ǂ (North Korean language). , GRQ¶W ZDQW WKHP WR EH DVKDPHG RI ZKHUH WKH\¶UH
from, or rather, ZKHUH,¶PIURP Many North Korean youngsters hide their North Korean 
identity EHFDXVHWKH\¶UHDVKDPHGDQGZDQWWRDYRLGGLVFULPLQDWLRQDJDLQVWWKHP by South 
Koreans here [in the UK].´18 However, even with the distance put between the Korean 
Peninsula and themselves, some North Koreans continue to grapple with a cognitive 
dissonance in regards to their North Korean background in their everyday lives. The British 
media frequently depicts North Korea in a pejorative fashion and young North Koreans try 
to hide their origins out of a fear of being bullied. Two participants under the age of 
eighteen explained to us that they tell their British and South Korean peers that they are 
from South Korea and not from the North. These concerns mirror the identity crisis that 
many North Koreans in South Korea experience and underline that secondary migration to 
the UK does not free North Koreans from the stigma of their national origins. 
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  Many North Koreans we interviewed supported a state-run economy, free education, 
and free healthcare. Many also agreed, that even during financial crises caused by the private 
sector, the state should be responsible for fixing the problem, while basic necessities 
including food, health, and education should be provided by the state. One participant went 
as far as to claim that the North Korean system is better than the South Korean system, 
despite the fact that the North Korean regime was unable to deliver the goods and services to 
its people. This participant explained that she had come to the UK to make use of the 
FRXQWU\¶V VRFLDO ZHOIDUH V\VWHP $QRWKHU SDUWLFLSDQW VZLIWO\ UHIXWHG ³, FDPH KHUH IRU
IUHHGRPQRW IRU IUHHELHV+HUH , FDQGRDQ\WKLQJ ,ZDQW´$ WKLUGSDUWLFLSDQW VDLGQRQHRI
these things mDWWHUHGVKHHPSKDVLVHGWKDWVKHFDPHWRWKH8.IRUKHUFKLOGUHQ¶VHGXFDWLRQ
³$WOHDVWLW¶VLQ(QJOLVK´VKHDGGHG0DQ\RIWKHRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWVZLWKVFKRRO-age children 
agreed with her comment.  
  Political literacy in the host society is important to the North Koreans we met during 
our research. Participants during our focus groups were divided when it came to discussions 
on political economy: Issues related to democracy, capitalism, and socialism were cause for 
vigorous debate. North Koreans are attuned and sensitive to power and power holders in the 
host society. One interlocutor explained ³Socialism is good, EXW 1RUWK .RUHD GLGQ¶W GR LW
well. The UK is doing it better.´ While another refuted, ³1R VRFLDOLVP LV WHUULEOH DQG VR
outdated. There is no true socialist country nowadays. The UK is not socialist´.19 During a 
focus group session, another topic sparking heated debate was on whether the North Korean 
community leaders had the political clout to influence British immigration policies. North 
Koreans in the UK choose community leaders who can best represent their needs in the host 
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society. However, even in the UK, Korean Peninsula power dynamics are reflected in the 
ethnic Korean community. 
 
Co-ethnic Conflicts among North and South Koreans, and Korean-Chinese 
Tensions exist within the North Korean community, and between North and South Koreans 
LQ1HZ0DOGHQµ%RUGHULQJSUDFWLFHV¶(Lee and Chien 2016) are reproduced within the ethnic 
Korean community, leading to frictions. Interlocutors reported growing schisms between 
New Malden North and South Koreans. Interviewees told us that South Korean restaurant 
owners in New Malden paid their North Korean employees below the minimum wage.20 
Such reports illustrated a relationship dynamic similar to that experienced by North Koreans 
in South Korea. The tensions reproduce, on a micro-level, Peninsula divisions within the 
diaspora and reflect the co-ethnic exploitation practiced by South Koreans towards North 
Koreans. Such practices are not unique to the Korean communities in the UK (Zhou 1998, Li 
2015). South Koreans in New Malden have expectations regarding the North Koreans they 
employ or socialise with. Tensions arise when North Koreans accumulate cultural capital ± 
English language skills, political acumen, transnational awareness, and advanced education ± 
that is emblematic of an upward mobility. As North Koreans acquire the symbolic aspects of 
South Korean modernity and success, it exacerbates underlying frictions with immigrants 
from South Korea because it challenges the accepted role of the South Korean as being 
FXOWXUDOO\DQGHFRQRPLFDOO\VXSHULRUWRWKHRVWHQVLEO\³SRRUDQGKHOSOHVV1RUWK.RUHDQV´21 
Many of them are surprised when they hear those same North Koreans they would like to 
help have economic means to survive, and considerable wealth accumulated in South Korea 
or in the UK. 
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  What makes the co-ethnic conflicts between North and South Koreans in the UK 
more complicated is the presence of the Korean-Chinese in between. This is not the focus for 
this study. However, a considerable number of Korean-Chinese have applied for asylum in 
the UK, disguised as North Koreans. The authenticity of North Korean identity has been 
contested among the Korean communities in the UK. This adds one more layer of 
complication in the co-ethnic dynamics in New Malden. 
 
Conclusion 
North Koreans engage in secondary migration to the UK because they calculate a multitude 
of socio-economic and symbolic factors in deciding their next destination. However, the co-
ethnic dynamics that arise, and the social and economic challenges that confront them in 
their new home illustrate that secondary migration may fall short of meeting their 
expectations. In spite of the difficulties that await individuals who on-migrate from South 
Korea, transnational migration networks, highly responsive to the shifting policies of 
destination countries, encourage North Koreans to leave South Korea. The apparent ease of 
secondary migration is compounded by the disappointment of life in South Korea and the 
desire to achieve the social and economic success that was expected prior to leaving North 
Korea. The symbols of success desired by North Korean secondary migrants are also 
familiar to ordinary South Koreans. 1RUWK .RUHDQV¶ GHVLUH WR DFFXPXODWH linguistic, 
economic, and cultural capital are a means to becoming what they understand as modern, 
successful, post-division Koreans. In choosing to accumulate symbols of prestige, they 
pursue a flexible form of citizenship that prioritises cultural and social symbols of South 
Korean modernity over political symbols of division such as a ROK passport and 
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citizenship rights.  
  This article has demonstrated how and why North Koreans in South Korea choose 
to on-migrate using transnational networks of brokers, family, and friends in a migratory 
system that organises migration into transit and destination countries. Further to the allure 
of Western destination countries, as they feature in the imaginaries of North Koreans, are 
disappointing resettlement experiences in South Korea and feelings of social discomfort 
due to the relocation of 1RUWK.RUHDQµYLOODJH¶ life to the suburbs of Seoul. We have argued 
that secondary migration to the UK allows migrants the chance to foster an identity hinging 
not on their socio-political background, but on their ability to consume and reproduce forms 
of symbolic capital valued in South Korea. However, resettlement in the UK is the 
beginning of another struggle for North Korean asylum seekers. North Koreans in the UK 
start over in a social, cultural, and political terrain with which they are largely unfamiliar. 
As some North Koreans in New Malden begin to improve their lives in the UK, tensions 
arise between the newcomers and already established South Koreans. These co-ethnic intra-
Korean dynamics in foreign soil reproduce Peninsula divisions that reflect a geo-politically 
unequal relationship embedded in the context of power and Cold War politics between the 
affluent South and the comparatively undeveloped, isolated North. North Koreans who 
SHUFHLYH WKHPVHOYHV DV µPDNLQJ LW¶ LQ WKHLU QHZ KRPH DUH OHVV ZLOOLQJ WR SOD\ WKH
subordinate role to South Koreans in the host society. Our findings underline that generous 
resettlement packages for refugees are not enough to facilitate the successful long-term 
assimilation of even individuals who share a language and cultural practices with the host 
society. If new arrivals feel marginalised in their attempts to improve their lives, they will 
be more willing to on-migrate in the hope that the next move will satisfy their desires. In 
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the case of North Koreans in South Korea, informal, transnational people moving networks 
have developed that promise North Korean asylum seekers something many feel they failed 
to achieve in South Korea ± economic success, access to reputable learning institutions, and 
the respect of their ethnic brethren.  
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[Annex 1. Interviews 2011-2017] 
 North Korean 
refugees 
South Korean 
religious leaders 
South Korean 
government 
officials 
UK government 
officials 
 
UK 17 (5 community
leaders) 
3 4 3  
South Korea 4 - 2 -  
Total 21 3 6 3 33 
 
[Annex 2. Focus Group Discussions and Outdoor Activities 2013-2014] 
 Focus 
Group1 
Focus 
Group2 
Focus 
Group3 
Focus 
Group4 
Focus 
Group5 
Outdoor1 Outdoor2 Outdoor3 
Topic History Politics Economy Culture and
Values  
Archaeology Higher 
Education 
Religion Thames 
River 
archaeology 
Location New Malden New Malden New Malden New Malden New Malden Cambridge 
University 
London 
Westminster 
Abbey 
London 
Tower 
Bridge 
Number of 
participants 
9 8 12 6 16 58 41 5 
*Due to the sensitivity associated with such questions, GDWD RQ WKH SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ sex, age, 
education and previous residence in North Korea were not collected. 
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